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@php-wasm/cli

PHP.wasm CLI for node.js

51
Versions
GPL-2.0-or-later
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

bgrgicakadamzielbrandonpayton-a8csejasdanielbachhuberyannickdecatjanjakesakirk

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Package now published via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; this is the expected automated release pattern for this monorepo. ai
semgrep semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect AI (semgrep): Fires in bundled third-party library code (fast-xml-parser/yargs) in the official WordPress Playground repo; not malicious. ai
semgrep semgrep:base64-decode AI (semgrep): Fires in bundled xdebug-bridge/CDP code in main.js; legitimate debug protocol usage. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:ws AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js, not directly imported as ESM. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:ini AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:yargs AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:xml2js AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:express AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:jsonc-parser AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
typosquat typosquat.levenshtein:joi AI (typosquat): @php-wasm/cli is a scoped package from WordPress org; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:fast-xml-parser AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@php-wasm/cli-util AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package, bundled into distribution artifact. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@php-wasm/universal AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package, bundled into distribution artifact. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:wasm-feature-detect AI (phantom-deps): Bundled CLI package; deps are bundled into main.js. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:fs-ext-extra-prebuilt AI (phantom-deps): Platform-specific binary package; expected phantom-dep pattern for prebuilt native modules. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@php-wasm/xdebug-bridge AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package, bundled into distribution artifact. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Legitimate WordPress/php-wasm project; short README and no keywords are cosmetic issues only. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@php-wasm/node AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package, bundled into distribution artifact. ai
semgrep semgrep:dynamic-require AI (semgrep): Fires inside bundled yargs code in main.js; not a malicious pattern for this CLI tool. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 72)

View all versions
Version Deps Published
3.1.36 4 / 0
3.1.35 4 / 0
3.1.34 4 / 0
3.1.33 4 / 0
3.1.32 4 / 0
3.1.31 4 / 0
3.1.30 4 / 0
3.1.29 4 / 0
3.1.28 14 / 0
3.1.27 14 / 0
3.1.26 14 / 0
3.1.25 13 / 0
3.1.22 13 / 0
3.1.21 13 / 0
3.1.20 13 / 0
3.1.19 13 / 0
3.1.18 13 / 0
3.1.16 13 / 0
3.1.15 13 / 0
3.1.14 13 / 0
3.1.13 13 / 0
3.1.12 13 / 0
3.1.11 13 / 0
3.1.10 13 / 0
3.1.9 13 / 0
3.1.8 13 / 0
3.1.5 13 / 0
3.1.4 13 / 0
3.1.3 13 / 0
3.1.2 13 / 0
3.1.1 13 / 0
3.1.0 13 / 0
3.0.54 12 / 0
3.0.53 12 / 0
3.0.52 12 / 0
3.0.51 12 / 0
3.0.46 12 / 0
3.0.45 12 / 0
3.0.44 12 / 0
3.0.43 12 / 0
3.0.42 12 / 0
3.0.41 12 / 0
3.0.40 12 / 0
3.0.39 12 / 0
3.0.38 12 / 0
3.0.37 12 / 0
3.0.36 12 / 0
3.0.35 12 / 0
3.0.34 12 / 0
3.0.33 12 / 0
3.0.32 12 / 0

v3.1.36

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.35

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.34

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.33

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.32

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.31

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.30

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.29

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.28

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.27

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.26

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.25

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.22

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.20

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.19

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.18

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.16

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.15

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.14

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.12

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.54

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.53

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.52

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.51

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.46

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.45

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.44

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.43

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.42

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.41

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.40

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.39

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.38

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.37

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.36

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.35

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.34

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.33

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.32

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.