@php-wasm/stream-compression
Stream-based compression bindings.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): WordPress Playground monorepo package; provenance not configured for this publisher's releases. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fs-ext | AI (phantom-deps): fs-ext is declared as an optionalDependency; phantom-dep false positive for optional deps in this package. | ai | |
| license | copyleft-license:GPL-2.0-or-later | AI (license): GPL-2.0-or-later is the declared license for the entire WordPress Playground project; stable across all versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Part of @php-wasm monorepo; sparse README and no keywords are expected for internal utility packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 83 of 83)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.47 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.46 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.45 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.44 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.43 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.42 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.41 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.40 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.39 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.38 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.36 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.35 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.34 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.33 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.32 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.31 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.30 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.29 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.28 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.27 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.26 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.25 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.22 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.21 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.20 | 1 / 0 | |
| 3.1.19 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.18 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.17 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.16 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.15 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.54 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.53 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.52 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.51 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.46 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.45 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.44 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.43 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.42 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.41 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.40 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.39 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.38 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.37 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.36 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.35 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.34 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.33 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.32 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.31 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.30 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.22 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.21 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.20 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.18 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.17 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.16 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 0 |
v3.1.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.39
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.31
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (adamziel) on 2025-12-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.30
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (adamziel) on 2025-12-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.