@pi-r/android
Android document constructor for E-mc.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@e-mc/document | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same author (anpham6/pi-r ecosystem); stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): No material changes vs prior version; repo and author identity are consistent; low-risk maintenance release. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Task runner extension; child_process use is intentional and args are sanitized before spawn. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-spawn | AI (semgrep): spawn() called with Document.sanitizeArgs(); legitimate task execution pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with 62 versions; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.12.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.11.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.11.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.11.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.11.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.10.4 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.10.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.10.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.10.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.9.5 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.8.5 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.7.6 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.6.10 | 7 / 0 |
v0.12.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.