@pipelab/core-node
The Pipelab automation engine for Node.js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Automation engine intentionally passes env to child processes via execa; standard pattern, not malicious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:slash | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep likely used transitively or in build config; heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:adm-zip | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep likely used transitively or in build config; heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:es-toolkit | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep likely used transitively or in build config; heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.1 | 16 / 11 |
v0.0.1
3 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 162 | stderr: "pipe", 163 | stdin: "pipe", > 164 | env: { 165 | ...process.env, 166 | ...execaOptions.env,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 178 | all: true, 179 | cancelSignal: signal, > 180 | env: { 181 | ...process.env, 182 | NODE_ENV: "production",
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.