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@pistonite/celera

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In-house UI framework

14
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

pistonite

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata url-dep:mono-dev AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; author's own mono-dev tooling pinned by SHA — does not affect consumers and is consistent across versions. ai

Versions (showing 14 of 14)

Version Deps Published
0.3.3 3 / 3
0.3.2 3 / 3
0.3.1 3 / 3
0.3.0 3 / 3
0.2.4 3 / 3
0.2.3 3 / 3
0.2.2 3 / 3
0.2.1 3 / 3
0.2.0 3 / 3
0.1.5 3 / 3
0.1.4 3 / 3
0.1.3 3 / 3
0.1.2 3 / 3
0.1.1 3 / 3

v0.3.3

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): mono-dev npm-metadata

Dependency 'mono-dev' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:Pistonight/mono-dev#097cb73266093ec0dbacd40f577cbe905b842102' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.2

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): mono-dev npm-metadata

Dependency 'mono-dev' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:Pistonight/mono-dev#097cb73266093ec0dbacd40f577cbe905b842102' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.1

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): mono-dev npm-metadata

Dependency 'mono-dev' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:Pistonight/mono-dev#097cb73266093ec0dbacd40f577cbe905b842102' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.