@pixiv/types-vrmc-materials-hdr-emissive-multiplier-1.0
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pixiv migrated publishing to GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this org's packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Pure TypeScript type-definition package; no deps, tiny payload, and sparse README are expected for this package type. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.5.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.5.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.4.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.4.1 | 0 / 0 |
v3.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.