@plasmicapp/loader-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@plasmicapp/isomorphic-unfetch | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped package; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Plasmic publishes many internal packages without full README/repo metadata; not indicative of spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.143 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.142 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.141 | 2 / 1 |
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.143
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.142
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.141
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.