@plasmicapp/loader-edge
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped monorepo sub-package; missing README/repo/keywords is consistent across all plasmicapp loader packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.76 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.75 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.74 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.73 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.72 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.71 | 1 / 1 |
v1.0.76
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.75
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.74
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.73
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.72
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.71
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.