@platforma-open/milaboratories.antibody-sequence-liabilities.liabilities-calc-script
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal tooling package in a known org scope; missing description is consistent across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established org package; lack of provenance is consistent with their publishing workflow. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@platforma-open/milaboratories.runenv-python-3 | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Python runtime dep declared in block-software config; not directly imported in JS but legitimately referenced. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal tooling package in a monorepo org; missing metadata is a style issue, not a spam/malware indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 5.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 4.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 1 |
v6.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (mike-ainsel) than the most recent previously approved version (dbolotin_mi) on 2026-03-26, but mike-ainsel is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v4.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.