@pmndrs/uikit-horizon
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation — expected for automated release pipelines in the pmndrs org. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pmndrs/uikit | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same pmndrs/uikit monorepo; stable false positive. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pmndrs/uikit-lucide | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same pmndrs/uikit monorepo; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.73 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.72 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.71 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.70 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.69 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.68 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.67 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.66 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.64 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.63 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.62 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.61 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.60 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.59 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.58 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.57 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.56 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.55 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.54 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.53 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.52 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.51 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.50 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.49 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.48 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.47 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.46 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.45 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.44 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.43 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.42 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.41 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.40 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.38 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.37 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.36 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.35 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.34 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.33 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.32 | 2 / 1 |
v1.0.73
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.72
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.71
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.70
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.69
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.68
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.67
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.66
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.64
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.63
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.62
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.61
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.60
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.59
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.58
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.57
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.56
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.55
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.54
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.53
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.52
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.51
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.46
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.45
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.41
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.