@pnpm/crypto.shasums-file
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/nodeReleaseKeys.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are PGP armored key blocks for Node.js release verification, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/nodeReleaseKeys.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Type declaration mirrors the PGP key constants; same benign pattern as the .js file. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is entirely explained by the addition of ~129KB of PGP public key data. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/crypto.hash | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency declared in package.json; phantom finding reflects indirect usage pattern, not a missing or malicious dep. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): The hex decode is a legitimate SHA256 hex-to-base64 conversion for computing integrity hashes from shasums files — core functionality of this package, not a malicious payload. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1100.1.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1100.1.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1100.1.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1100.1.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1100.0.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1001.0.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 1001.0.5 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1001.0.4 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1001.0.3 | 3 / 1 |
v1100.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1001.0.6
3 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
v1001.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1001.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.