@pnpm/deps.graph-builder
A package for building a dependency graph from a lockfile
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): zkochan is a known pnpm core maintainer; transition from pnpmuser to zkochan is a legitimate account consolidation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/hooks.types | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope; listed as a runtime dep in package.json, likely type-only import pattern common in pnpm monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1100.0.26 | 16 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.22 | 16 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.21 | 16 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.20 | 16 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.19 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.18 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.17 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.16 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.15 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.14 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.13 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.12 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.11 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.10 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.9 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.8 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.7 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.6 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.5 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.4 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.3 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.2 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.1 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1100.0.0 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.17 | 15 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.13 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.12 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.11 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.10 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.9 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.8 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.7 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.6 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.5 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.4 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.3 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.2 | 14 / 3 | |
| 1002.3.1 | 14 / 3 |
v1100.0.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.17
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.