@pnpm/exe

The directory `dist/node_modules/graceful-fs` byte-matched 5 of 6 file(s) against [email protected] — a version that passed review and that we hold in storage — which identifies it as a vendored copy of that package. But 1 file(s) inside it differ from that package's bytes at the same path: dist/node_modules/graceful-fs/graceful-fs.js. A vendored library that is a faithful copy except for a handful of altered files is a well-worn supply-chain shape — the surrounding real code lends the tree legitimacy while the altered files carry the payload. These files are NOT exempt from any authorship heuristic; diff them against [email protected] before greenflagging.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.

Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.

Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.

The directory `dist/node_modules/graceful-fs` byte-matched 5 of 6 file(s) against [email protected] — a version that passed review and that we hold in storage — which identifies it as a vendored copy of that package. But 1 file(s) inside it differ from that package's bytes at the same path: dist/node_modules/graceful-fs/graceful-fs.js. A vendored library that is a faithful copy except for a handful of altered files is a well-worn supply-chain shape — the surrounding real code lends the tree legitimacy while the altered files carry the payload. These files are NOT exempt from any authorship heuristic; diff them against [email protected] before greenflagging.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (pnpmuser) on 2026-07-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.

This version was published by a different npm account (pnpmuser) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-10, but pnpmuser is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.