@pnpm/manifest-utils
Utils for dealing with package manifest
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established pnpm monorepo package with clean publisher history; lack of provenance is consistent across all prior versions and is not a security concern here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/error | AI (phantom-deps): @pnpm/error is a same-org scoped package listed in dependencies; phantom detection is a false positive for this internal pnpm utility package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1002.0.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1002.0.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1002.0.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1002.0.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1002.0.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1002.0.0 | 3 / 2 |
v1002.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1002.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.