@pnpm/resolve-dependencies
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer pnpmuser (confirmed maintainer on prior versions); payload clean, no malicious behavior. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/constants | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo internal dep; same-org scope, expected pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/pick-fetcher | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo internal dep; same-org scope, expected pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/workspace.spec-parser | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo internal dep; same-org scope, expected pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:safe-promise-defer | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dep; stable pattern in this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1008.8.5 | 42 / 6 | |
| 1008.8.4 | 41 / 6 | |
| 1008.8.3 | 41 / 6 | |
| 1008.8.2 | 41 / 6 | |
| 1008.8.1 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.8.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.7 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.6 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.5 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.4 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.3 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.2 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.1 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.7.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.6.2 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.6.1 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.6.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.5.3 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.5.2 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.5.1 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.5.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.4.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.3.1 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.3.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.2.4 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.2.3 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.2.2 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.2.1 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.2.0 | 40 / 5 | |
| 1008.1.1 | 39 / 5 | |
| 1008.1.0 | 39 / 5 | |
| 1008.0.2 | 39 / 5 | |
| 1008.0.1 | 38 / 5 | |
| 1008.0.0 | 38 / 5 |
v1008.8.5
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (pnpmuser) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-10, but pnpmuser is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1008.7.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (zkochan) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-02-17, but zkochan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1008.2.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zkochan) than the most recent previously approved version (pnpmuser) on 2025-09-29, but zkochan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.