@pnpm/workspace.injected-deps-syncer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Likely CI config variance across pnpm's many monorepo packages; publisher has strong long-term track record. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are renamed @pnpm/* sibling packages within the same monorepo, not foreign additions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/types | AI (phantom-deps): Same org scope (@pnpm); type-only dep used at build time, not a runtime phantom. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/normalize-path | AI (phantom-deps): Type definitions package; not directly imported at runtime by convention. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 57)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1100.0.28 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.27 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.26 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.25 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.24 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.23 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.22 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.21 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.20 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.19 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.18 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.17 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.16 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.15 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.14 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.13 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.12 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.11 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.10 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.9 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.8 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.7 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.6 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.5 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.4 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.3 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.2 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.1 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1100.0.0 | 10 / 4 | |
| 1000.0.45 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.44 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.43 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.42 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.41 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.40 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.39 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.38 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.37 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.36 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.35 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.34 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.33 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.32 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.31 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.30 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.29 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.28 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.27 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.26 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.25 | 9 / 3 | |
| 1000.0.24 | 9 / 3 |
v1100.0.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.0.45
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
v1000.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.