@polarityio/pi-card
Card container component with optional collapsible title bar and icon support
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with org-level CI/CD automation for @polarityio packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polarityio/pi-icon | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same @polarityio org monorepo; expected dependency pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@polarityio/pi-shared | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same @polarityio org monorepo; expected dependency pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): GitHub Actions publisher; provenance absence is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 0 |
v1.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.