@posthog/plugin-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is confirmed by SLSA attestation; legitimate for PostHog org packages. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Artifact of CI/CD publish environment; SLSA attestation provides stronger commit linkage. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Intentional env forwarding in a CLI subprocess helper; stable pattern for this build-tool package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped PostHog utility package; sparse README/keywords are cosmetic, not spam indicators. | ai |
v1.1.1
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 45 | */ 46 | export function buildCliEnv(config: ResolvedPluginConfig): NodeJS.ProcessEnv { > 47 | return { 48 | ...process.env, 49 | RUST_LOG: `posthog_cli=${config.logLevel}`,
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 45 | */ 46 | export function buildCliEnv(config: ResolvedPluginConfig): NodeJS.ProcessEnv { > 47 | return { 48 | ...process.env, 49 | RUST_LOG: `posthog_cli=${config.logLevel}`,
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.