@powersync/adapter-sql-js
A development DB adapter based on SQL.js for PowerSync
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/bundle.mjs | AI (source-diff): sql.js/asm.js bundle legitimately contains long encoded strings; stable pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.18 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.0.17 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.0.16 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 7 |
v0.0.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (journeyapps-platform) on 2026-02-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.15
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (journeyapps-platform) on 2026-02-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.