@prairielearn/sanitize
A collection of functions for sanitizing and escaping various values.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by CI/CD migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish pipeline. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 3.0.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 3.0.4 | 0 / 6 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 7 | |
| 3.0.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 2.1.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 2.1.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 2.0.22 | 0 / 6 |
v3.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.