@press-js/browser
Browser runtime contracts and preview helpers for Press.js.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@press-js/core | AI (dependencies): Same-monorepo sibling package at matching version; not an independent third-party dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@press-js/fonts | AI (dependencies): Same-monorepo sibling package at matching version; not an independent third-party dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.