@press-js/cli
CLI for Press.js.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @press-js/cli package; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is coincidental, not a squatting attempt. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.