@prisma-next/sql-runtime
SQL runtime implementation for Prisma Next
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/accelerate-EEKAFGN3-SHR4XFVV.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled Prisma query-plan-executor/Hono code, not a dropper. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/pg_dump-SG4KYBUB.js | AI (source-diff): pg_dump WASM tool bundle via pglite-tools, legitimate. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/dist-WLKUVDN2.js | AI (source-diff): Same pglite bundle; emscripten loader pattern, not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dist-WLKUVDN2.js | AI (source-diff): Minified pglite/electric-sql bundle, build output not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling of new internal @prisma-next/* scoped deps; no obfuscation detected. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New files are build artifacts from bundling internal monorepo packages; no injected payloads. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of previous maintainer consistent with org-level CI publishing transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer change accompanies CI/CD migration; same official Prisma org. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; consistent with official prisma/prisma-next repo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@prisma-next/operations | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; may be re-exported rather than directly imported in this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@prisma-next/ids | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; may be re-exported rather than directly imported in this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.16.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.15.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.14.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.13.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.12.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.11.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.10.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.9.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.8.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.7.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.6.1 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.5.1 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.5.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.4.4 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.4.3 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.4.2 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.4.1 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.3.0 | 10 / 8 | |
| 0.2.0 | 7 / 7 | |
| 0.0.1 | 5 / 8 |
v0.16.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
6 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.