@profullstack/sh1pt-policy
Store-policy linter for sh1pt — catches rejections before submission.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.