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@progress/kendo-angular-dialog

23
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

progress

Keywords

ProgressAngularDialogWindowangularjsmodalconfirmationalert

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Progress/Telerik migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI; consistent with org-wide CI/CD transition across the Kendo Angular suite. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Long-established Progress/Telerik package; absence of Sigstore provenance is consistent across their entire catalog. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:tslib AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard Angular/TypeScript runtime implicit dep; stable false positive for this package. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@progress/kendo-angular-schematics AI (phantom-deps): Schematics are tooling deps not directly imported at runtime; expected pattern for Angular packages. ai

Versions (showing 23 of 23)

Version Deps Published
24.1.0 3 / 0
24.0.3 3 / 0
24.0.2 3 / 0
24.0.1 3 / 0
24.0.0 3 / 0
23.4.0 3 / 0
23.3.0 3 / 0
23.2.2 3 / 0
23.2.1 3 / 0
23.2.0 3 / 0
23.1.0 3 / 0
23.0.1 3 / 0
23.0.0 3 / 0
22.0.1 3 / 0
22.0.0 3 / 0
21.4.1 3 / 0
21.4.0 3 / 0
21.3.0 3 / 0
21.2.0 3 / 0
21.1.0 3 / 0
21.0.1 3 / 0
21.0.0 3 / 0
20.1.2 3 / 0

v24.1.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v24.0.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v24.0.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v24.0.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v24.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v23.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v23.2.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v23.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v23.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-27) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v23.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v23.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v23.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v22.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v22.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.4.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.4.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: progress → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.2.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.1.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.0.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v21.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v20.1.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.