@propellerads/label
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to org account (noc_propellerads) with 7 approved packages; consistent with org-level publishing migration. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 4.0.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 4.0.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 4.0.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 7 |
v4.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.