@proximus/lavender-eda-button
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Part of @proximus/lavender-eda-* monorepo design system; missing metadata is typical for internal component packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.3 | 0 / 0 |
v1.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.