@psraghuveer/memento-dashboard
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-Bxqyb_1x.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React minified bundle; sample confirms React production build output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-BO7Qbqyo.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified React bundle; expected artifact from build:ui script. Not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-DXrt9R-1.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified React bundle; consistent with build:ui script and React license header visible in sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-D3MYu3aA.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React production bundle; minified not obfuscated, consistent with build:ui script in package.json. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-BTAOSzZv.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React production bundle; minified not obfuscated. Expected artifact for a UI dashboard package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-BILDYLNY.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React production bundle; minified output from documented build:ui script, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-CRz1badW.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React minified bundle; sample shows React production code with license headers, not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist-ui/assets/index-GzFhnal0.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-minified React bundle; consistent with build:ui script output. Not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:open | AI (phantom-deps): Workspace package; open is a legitimate runtime dep used indirectly. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@psraghuveer/memento-schema | AI (phantom-deps): Workspace sibling dependency; expected pattern in monorepo structure. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@hono/node-server | AI (phantom-deps): Workspace package; @hono/node-server is a legitimate runtime dep used indirectly. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.7 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.6 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.5 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.4 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.3 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.2 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.1 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.4.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.2.1 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.1.2 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 20 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 20 |
v0.5.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.7
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.6
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.5
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.