@pulumi/docker-build
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): Standard Pulumi provider plugin installer pattern used across all @pulumi/* resource packages. Runs pulumi plugin install via child_process — documented and expected behavior. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process is used by the standard Pulumi plugin installer script to invoke the pulumi CLI. This is the canonical install mechanism for all Pulumi resource providers. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Pulumi publishes via pulumi-bot automation; lack of Sigstore provenance is consistent across their npm releases and not a risk signal given the established publisher trust. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.17 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.0.15 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.0.12 | 1 / 2 |
v0.0.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
2 findingsScript: node scripts/install-pulumi-plugin.js resource docker-build 0.0.15
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.