@putout/plugin-spread
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:eslint-plugin-putout | AI (phantom-deps): eslint-plugin-putout is a config-only dependency in the putout ecosystem; not directly imported by design. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 6 |
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.