@pydantic/genai-prices
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard vite minified bundle; content is plaintext LLM pricing data, no obfuscation or malicious payload. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Pydantic org migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; this is expected and more secure than human publishing. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 53)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.64 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.63 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.62 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.61 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.60 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.56 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.55 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.54 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.53 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.52 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.51 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.50 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.49 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.48 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.47 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.46 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.45 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.44 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.43 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.42 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.41 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.40 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.39 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.38 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.37 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.36 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.35 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.34 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.33 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.32 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.31 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.30 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.29 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.28 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.27 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.26 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.25 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.24 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.23 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.22 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.21 | 1 / 20 | |
| 0.0.20 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.0.19 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.18 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.17 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.16 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 8 |
v0.0.64
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.63
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.62
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.61
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.60
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.56
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.52
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.51
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.49
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.48
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.36
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.35
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.34
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.33
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.32
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.31
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.30
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.29
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.28
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.27
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.26
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.25
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.24
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.23
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.22
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.21
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.