@pydantic/logfire-browser
JavaScript Browser SDK for Logfire - https://pydantic.dev/logfire
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/browserMetrics-ClpXqdqf.js | AI (source-diff): Minified bundler output for new web-vitals metrics feature, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase matches legitimately added OTel metrics/web-vitals feature code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/browserMetrics-bhbn_Yb6.cjs | AI (source-diff): CJS twin of the same minified metrics bundle; benign build output. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/core | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep used transitively/bundled; not a direct import in source but legitimately needed. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Pydantic org package; absence of Sigstore attestation is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; missing gitHead is a minor metadata gap, not a supply chain risk for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @opentelemetry/otlp-transformer is a standard OpenTelemetry package, consistent with this SDK's purpose. | ai |
Versions (showing 36 of 36)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.17.4 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.17.3 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.17.2 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.17.1 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.17.0 | 10 / 7 | |
| 0.16.4 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.16.3 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.16.2 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.16.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.16.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.15.3 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.15.2 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.15.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.15.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.14.3 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.14.2 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.14.1 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.14.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.13.0 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.12.3 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.12.2 | 8 / 9 | |
| 0.12.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.12.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.11.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.10.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.9.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.9.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.8.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 0.8.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 0.7.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 9 | |
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 9 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 9 | |
| 0.3.1 | 6 / 9 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 9 |
v0.17.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (pydantic-user) on 2025-09-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.