@qdrant/js-client-rest
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:openapi-typescript-fetch | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned immutable commit, long-standing dep of the official qdrant client; no lifecycle scripts or payload. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@sevinf/maybe | AI (dependencies): Pinned small utility dep in a well-established, high-download package; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Qdrant official package with 442.5k weekly downloads and known GitHub repo; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.18.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.17.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.16.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.16.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.16.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 1.15.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 1.15.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 1.14.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 1.14.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.13.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.12.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.11.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.10.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.9.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.8.2 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.8.1 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.8.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 1.7.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.6.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.5.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.4.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.3.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.2.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.2.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 1.1.6 | 2 / 14 | |
| 1.1.5 | 2 / 14 | |
| 1.1.4 | 2 / 15 | |
| 1.1.3 | 2 / 15 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 15 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 15 |
v1.15.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.14.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.13.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.5
2 findingsDependency 'openapi-typescript-fetch' in `dependencies` points to 'github:Rendez/openapi-typescript-fetch#c114c381602b9b3891f0ec45dbc5409816743dad' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.4
2 findingsDependency 'openapi-typescript-fetch' in `dependencies` points to 'github:Rendez/openapi-typescript-fetch#ea89f6480e498ec022e2f2f67f85004eb54e6f54' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.3
2 findingsDependency 'openapi-typescript-fetch' in `dependencies` points to 'github:Rendez/openapi-typescript-fetch#ea89f6480e498ec022e2f2f67f85004eb54e6f54' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsDependency 'openapi-typescript-fetch' in `dependencies` points to 'github:Rendez/openapi-typescript-fetch#ea89f6480e498ec022e2f2f67f85004eb54e6f54' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsDependency 'openapi-typescript-fetch' in `dependencies` points to 'github:Rendez/openapi-typescript-fetch#ea89f6480e498ec022e2f2f67f85004eb54e6f54' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.