@quasar/cli
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Standard child-process spawn pattern for a CLI tool; passing process.env to subprocesses is expected and intentional. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Global CLI delegating to local install via dynamic require is a well-established, intentional pattern. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @quasar/cli package from the official Quasar Framework org; no relation to joi. | ai |
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 54 | name, 55 | params.filter(param => typeof param === 'string' && param.length !== 0), > 56 | { cwd: cwd || appPaths.appDir, env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: env } }, 57 | onFail 58 | )
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 54 | name, 55 | params.filter(param => typeof param === 'string' && param.length !== 0), > 56 | { cwd: cwd || appPaths.appDir, env: { ...process.env, NODE_ENV: env } }, 57 | onFail 58 | )
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.