@quenty/boundingboxutils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:preinstall | AI (install-scripts): only-allow pnpm enforcer; standard monorepo pattern, stable for this package. | ai |
v4.5.2
2 findingsScript: npx only-allow pnpm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.1
2 findingsScript: npx only-allow pnpm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.