@questpie/next
Next.js App Router adapter for QUESTPIE. Exports catch-all route handlers that mount CRUD, auth, storage, custom app routes, and realtime routes.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish to GitHub Actions with SLSA/Sigstore attestation; legitimate CI/CD migration for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:nuxt | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @questpie/next belongs to the questpie org; not a typosquat of nuxt. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:jest | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @questpie/next belongs to the questpie org; not a typosquat of jest. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:knex | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @questpie/next belongs to the questpie org; not a typosquat of knex. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:questpie | AI (dependencies): questpie is the same org's own core package; expected dependency for this scoped utility. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-peer-dep:questpie | AI (dependencies): questpie peer dep is the same org's own package; expected and intentional. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.5.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.5.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.5.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.4.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 3 |
v3.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.