@radix-ui/react-context-menu
View docs [here](https://radix-ui.com/primitives/docs/components/context-menu).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing under WorkOS org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): npm-workos reflects WorkOS acquisition of Radix UI; organizational change. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Individual maintainers replaced by org account after WorkOS acquisition. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo sub-package; description omission is cosmetic, not suspicious. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-menu | AI (dependencies): @radix-ui/react-menu is a core Radix UI primitive and a stable expected dependency of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Radix UI packages are published without Sigstore provenance attestation; this is consistent across all versions and not a security concern given the established publisher. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI monorepo sub-packages consistently have minimal READMEs and no keywords; this is a structural pattern of the project, not a spam indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.1 | 5 / 8 | |
| 2.3.0 | 5 / 8 | |
| 2.2.16 | 6 / 10 | |
| 2.2.15 | 6 / 10 | |
| 2.2.14 | 6 / 10 | |
| 2.2.13 | 6 / 10 |
v2.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.