@radix-ui/react-dropdown-menu
View docs [here](https://radix-ui.com/primitives/docs/components/dropdown-menu).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established Radix package; missing gitHead is a build-env change, not malicious. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate org transition (WorkOS/Radix); chancestrickland is established publisher. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): WorkOS acquisition of Radix UI; new maintainers are known org members. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Old Radix maintainers replaced by WorkOS team as part of known transition. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy due to org transition; resumed publishing under new ownership. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI primitives use minimal READMEs by convention; not spam. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Radix UI primitives consistently omit descriptions; not indicative of malice for this well-known package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Radix UI primitives predate Sigstore provenance adoption; absence is expected for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.24 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.23 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.22 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.21 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.20 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.19 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.18 | 7 / 8 | |
| 2.1.17 | 7 / 8 | |
| 2.1.16 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.15 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.14 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.13 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.12 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.11 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.10 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.9 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.8 | 7 / 10 | |
| 2.1.7 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.6 | 7 / 9 | |
| 2.1.5 | 7 / 7 | |
| 2.1.4 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2.1.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2.1.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 2.0.6 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.5 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 8 / 0 |
v2.1.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.12
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.11
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.10
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.9
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.8
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.1.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (vladmoroz) than the most recent previously approved version (benoitgrelard) on 2024-06-21, but vladmoroz is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (vladmoroz) than the most recent previously approved version (benoitgrelard) on 2024-06-19, but vladmoroz is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.