@radix-ui/react-hover-card
View docs [here](https://radix-ui.com/primitives/docs/components/hover-card).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-popper | AI (dependencies): Sibling Radix UI package; part of the same monorepo and ecosystem, not a third-party risk. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Consistent with GitHub Actions publish flow; SLSA provenance present instead. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): npm-workos is the WorkOS org account; WorkOS acquired Radix UI. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Previous individual maintainers replaced by org account; legitimate transition. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate migration to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing for the radix-ui org. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Radix UI component packages consistently omit descriptions; not indicative of malicious intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Radix UI package; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI component packages intentionally have minimal READMEs and no keywords; not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.23 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.22 | 10 / 7 | |
| 1.1.21 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.20 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.19 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.18 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.17 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.16 | 9 / 7 | |
| 1.1.15 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.14 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.13 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.12 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.11 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.10 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.9 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.8 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1.1.7 | 9 / 8 | |
| 1.1.6 | 9 / 8 | |
| 1.1.5 | 9 / 6 | |
| 1.1.4 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.1.3 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.0.7 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.6 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.5 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 10 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 10 / 0 |
v1.1.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.12
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.