@railgun-community/wallet
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Part of same legitimate CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Publisher has established 8-package approved track record; org-level transition. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/tests/mocks.test.js | AI (source-diff): Crypto test fixtures/mock ciphertext, not a hidden payload. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:ethers | AI (npm-metadata): Railgun-Community/ethers.js is the project's own pinned fork at a specific tag; intentional and stable for this package. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Runs a local postinstall.js bundled with the package; consistent with cross-platform SDK setup across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:stream-browserify | AI (phantom-deps): Browser polyfill declared as dep for bundler config; stable false positive for this cross-platform SDK. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:events | AI (phantom-deps): Browser polyfill declared as dep for bundler config; stable false positive for this cross-platform SDK. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:assert | AI (phantom-deps): Browser polyfill declared as dep for bundler config; stable false positive for this cross-platform SDK. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.8.6 | 24 / 25 | |
| 10.8.5 | 24 / 25 | |
| 10.8.4 | 24 / 25 | |
| 10.8.3 | 24 / 25 | |
| 10.8.1 | 24 / 25 | |
| 8.1.0 | 24 / 25 |
v10.8.4
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (ptsimpso) on 2026-03-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.8.3
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (ptsimpso) on 2026-02-09, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v10.8.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.