@rango-dev/signer-cosmos
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes Cosmos wallet public key from signature response — standard cryptographic usage, not obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.40.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.39.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.39.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.38.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.37.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.36.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.35.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.34.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.33.0 | 6 / 1 |
v0.40.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.38.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.37.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.35.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.34.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.33.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.