@rcrsr/rill-ext-gemini
rill extension for Google Gemini API integration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual author to GitHub Actions CI is expected for monorepo automation; backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@rcrsr/rill-ext-llm-shared | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo package (workspace:^); not an external third-party dependency. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@rcrsr/rill-ext-param-shared | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org runtime dep; likely re-exported rather than directly imported in source files. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.2 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.19.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.19.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.18.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.18.3 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.18.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.18.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.8.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 1 |
v0.19.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.