@rcrsr/rill-ext-mcp
rill extension for Model Context Protocol (MCP) integration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; legitimate CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@rcrsr/rill-ext-param-shared | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; likely re-exported rather than directly imported in this package's source. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.1 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.19.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.18.4 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.18.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.18.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.11.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.8.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.8.5 | 1 / 5 |
v0.19.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.