@react-hookz/web
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@ver0/deep-equal | AI (dependencies): @ver0 is the same namespace as the package's own devDependencies, indicating it's maintained by the same author. This is a trusted internal dependency, not a suspicious third-party one. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with a clear, verifiable GitHub repo. Lack of Sigstore provenance is common (~88% of npm packages) and not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 26.1.0 | 1 / 18 | |
| 26.0.0 | 1 / 18 | |
| 25.3.0 | 1 / 18 | |
| 25.2.2 | 1 / 18 | |
| 25.2.1 | 1 / 17 | |
| 25.2.0 | 1 / 17 | |
| 25.1.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 25.1.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 25.0.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 25.0.0 | 1 / 22 |
v26.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.2.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (xobotyi) on 2026-07-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v25.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.