@readium/shared
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@edrlab/thorium-locales | AI (dependencies): GitHub URL dep on @edrlab/thorium-locales is a documented, intentional pattern in the Readium/EDRLab ecosystem; the source org is the same trusted organization. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@edrlab/thorium-locales | AI (npm-metadata): GitHub URL dep is explicitly managed via an update-locales script in package.json; intentional and stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 14 | |
| 2.1.4 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.1.3 | 0 / 13 | |
| 2.1.2 | 0 / 13 | |
| 2.1.1 | 0 / 13 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 13 |
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.