@recast-navigation/generators
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@recast-navigation/wasm | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dependency; likely bundled/re-exported rather than directly imported in source. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped sub-package of a real project; sparse README and no keywords are expected for internal monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.43.1 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.43.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.42.1 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.42.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.41.0 | 2 / 11 | |
| 0.40.0 | 2 / 14 |
v0.43.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.43.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.42.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.