@redhat-cloud-services/hcc-feo-mcp
HCC Frontend Operator MCP package for dynamic schema-driven FEO configuration management
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publisher with SLSA provenance; expected for Red Hat org automation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal consistent with shift to automated CI/CD publishing under Red Hat org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:typescript | AI (phantom-deps): TypeScript listed as runtime dep but used as build tooling; common pattern in TS packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 6 / 0 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.