@reduxjs/toolkit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer acemarke; benign build-only diff, no malicious behavior. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get() in combineSlices.ts is used inside a Proxy get trap — the canonical idiomatic pattern for forwarding property access. Not obfuscation; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.12.0 | 6 / 48 | |
| 2.11.2 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.11.1 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.11.0 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.10.1 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.10.0 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.9.2 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.9.1 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.9.0 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.8.2 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.8.1 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.8.0 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.7.0 | 6 / 54 | |
| 2.6.1 | 4 / 53 | |
| 2.6.0 | 4 / 53 | |
| 2.5.1 | 4 / 52 | |
| 2.5.0 | 4 / 52 | |
| 2.4.0 | 4 / 50 | |
| 2.3.0 | 4 / 50 | |
| 2.2.8 | 4 / 50 | |
| 2.2.7 | 4 / 50 | |
| 2.2.6 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.2.5 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.2.4 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.2.3 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.2.2 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.2.1 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.2.0 | 4 / 45 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 43 | |
| 2.0.1 | 4 / 43 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 43 |
v2.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2025-04-16, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2025-03-07, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2025-02-23, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2025-01-26, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2024-12-11, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2024-11-28, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2024-10-14, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2024-10-08, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2024-07-27, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (phryneas) than the most recent previously approved version (acemarke) on 2024-06-29, but phryneas is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (phryneas) than the most recent previously approved version (acemarke) on 2024-03-31, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (acemarke) than the most recent previously approved version (phryneas) on 2024-03-21, but acemarke is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (phryneas) than the most recent previously approved version (acemarke) on 2024-02-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (phryneas) than the most recent previously approved version (acemarke) on 2024-01-24, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.