@reference-ui/lib
Foundational design system package built on `@reference-ui/core`.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/runtime/reference-ui/styled/css/css.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are minified CSS utility property maps from a CSS-in-JS build system (Panda CSS style). Content is readable and benign — not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/runtime/reference-ui/styled/jsx/is-valid-prop.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are serialized CSS prop name lists from a CSS-in-JS build artifact. Content is readable and benign — not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/node_modules/@reference-ui/styled/css/css.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are dense CSS property-to-shorthand alias maps from a styled-system generator (PandaCSS pattern). No eval, network, or shell usage. Minified utility data, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/node_modules/@reference-ui/styled/jsx/is-valid-prop.js | AI (source-diff): Long lines are CSS prop name lists for JSX prop filtering — standard styled-system output. Fully readable, no malicious patterns. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:glob | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @reference-ui/lib is a UI component library with no relation to the 'glob' filesystem utility. Levenshtein match is purely coincidental; no impersonation intent. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@reference-ui/core | AI (dependencies): @reference-ui/core is a sibling package in the same monorepo, as confirmed by the build scripts and shared GitHub repository. Expected internal dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.20 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.19 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.18 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.16 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.14 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.12 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 3 |
v0.0.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.