@reteps/dockerfmt
Bindings around the Golang `dockerfmt` tooling. It compiles the Go code to WebAssembly (using standard Go's `GOOS=js GOARCH=wasm` target), which is then used in the JS bindings.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): format.wasm is the package's own tinygo build output, matches build-go script. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:typescript | AI (phantom-deps): typescript used for build/tsc, referenced in config not runtime imports. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.5.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.5.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.5.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.5.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.2.8 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 0.2.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 1 |
v0.3.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/format.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.